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Homelessness & the Limits of Hospitality 
Anya Daly says we’ll solve homelessness only when we see it as our problem.  
“No face can be approached with empty hands and closed home.” 
“The need of the other is my spiritual need.” 
Emmanuel Levinas 
Coming home on the tram my gaze met that of a young man shouldering a carry-all – heavy, and 
torn in parts. I looked away quickly. Clearly that carry-all carried all his belongings, and, I 
hoped, food for the wet, icy night ahead under the bridge. I knew I was going home to company 
and a hearty soup. Part of me wanted to suggest he come back and share soup with us; but the 
greater part was fearful: he could be dangerous, perhaps a drug user, and even if neither of these, 
how could we then turn him out into the cold again? The limits of my hospitality – my fear. 
This article explores the issue of homelessness from the perspective of someone who has 
experienced homelessness, as someone who has worked with the homeless and heard the stories 
of ‘our friends on the street’, as a mother distressed to see other mothers’ children, no matter 
their age, in such dire circumstances, and as a philosopher driven to interrogate the hidden 
assumptions and beliefs motivating our choices, judgments, and behavior. I wish to stress that 
homelessness must be addressed from the philosophical perspective not only with regard to the 
individual, but also with regard to the individual as belonging to the ‘we’. This ‘we’ must include 
all the people involved, from the homeless person laying out her swag under the bridge, to the 
policy-makers earning fabulous salaries. I’ll propose that a deeper understanding of what’s called 
‘double incorporation’ is a crucial step towards galvanizing political will to implement solutions 
that have already been identified. 
The first part of this article will relate my experience with regard to homelessness to provide 
context. The second part will examine some philosophical considerations around the notion of 
‘home’. I am taking a phenomenological approach to this discussion, not an analytic approach 
which depends predominantly on arguments. For phenomenology, the world is not reducible to 
propositions, and so it depends on a wide repertoire of philosophical methods – detailed 
descriptive analysis and evocations as well as arguments. Philosophical understanding, for 
phenomenology, is as much a ‘showing’ as a ‘telling’. 
The Lived Experience of Homelessness 
The problem of homelessness first hit me when I was living in Paris when there was a huge 
housing crisis. At one point there were tents all along the Canal Saint Martin and filling the Place 
de la République. There were many, many beggars on the streets. I remember for the last months 
of one winter I would cross the canal at a small bridge under which lived an old man and a young 
woman. In the morning I would regularly see her preparing herself for her work day – doing her 
hair, putting on her make-up, and tidying away her bedding. Clearly, she had a job but the salary 
could not cover rent. That was shocking for me, especially when I learnt of the rich people who 
had many vacant apartments they did not want to rent, either because they were waiting for the 
rental market to give higher returns or because it was more advantageous for them to just keep 
the apartments empty, solely as investments. 
In my fifth year in France I moved to Toulouse and there suffered a life-threatening accident. On 
my return to Australia I was homeless because I was unable to work. Fortunately for me, I had 
family and friends who ensured I always had a roof over my head. That year I lived in six 
different situations before gaining affordable housing. Even in the comparatively favorable 
situation of being cared for, I was deeply shaken in my sense of self because of the loss of 
independence, because I had no base that was mine. So once I had regained my health I 
volunteered with the Salvation Army, raising funds, and also with the Orange Sky Laundry, a 
mobile laundry service for the homeless established by two young Brisbane men and run entirely 
with volunteers. It now operates in fourteen cities in Australia. 
The service is as much about the conversations as getting the laundry done. The site I worked at 
in Melbourne was in the posh part of the central city, in what is known as the Paris end of 
Collins Street. In fact we parked the van and set up our chairs directly outside Dior, adjacent to a 
small terrace area that the homeless people had taken over. They called it ‘the community 
kitchen’, since from there they organised collections of food donations from the various cafés 
around the inner city. Of course the businesses were not happy about this – these destitute people 
were occupying prime real estate – and eventually the city council cleared out all their 
belongings, removed the seats, and installed plant boxes. So what had been effectively the 
equivalent of a home-base for them was destroyed. Some were given emergency 
accommodation, but most had to find another place to doss. 
It felt good to be doing something. The practical aid, the solidarity, and the sympathy were 
clearly appreciated; and, I must confess, it did help to somewhat relieve my own distress and 
guilt about their desperate and, more often than not, deteriorating lives. To an extent, we are all 
complicit in this terrible injustice. We have allowed the neoliberal agenda to override our 
consciences, to override our fellow-feeling, and to allow us to conveniently ignore the core value 
of ‘fair play’. Most certainly we can say that some of these people have contributed, sometimes 
significantly, to their own wretched situations; but nonetheless, the systemic injustices are 
pervasive and pernicious. The paths to sleeping rough are numerous: domestic violence; sexual 
abuse; debt; psychiatric problems; unemployment; underemployment; the bank foreclosing on 
the home or farm; PTSD following military service; incapacitating accidents; drug and alcohol 
addiction; not having the means to get back to a home country; having relied on the support of 
friends and family one time too many; family break-up; housing which is dangerous because of 
drugs and violence, etc. This is clearly not a ‘one size fits all’ problem; it is various and 
multifaceted. 
 
In August 2016 I participated in a one-day workshop titled ‘Homelessness and Housing 
Insecurity’. One observation from the only participating anthropologist was the need to consider 
factors upstream from the outcome of homelessness: nothing less than critiquing the economic 
system which has without question set the stage for it, and for many other social injustices which 
in turn feed into the injustice of homelessness. But in my view we need to go even further 
upstream to look for causes in our conceptions of ourselves; specifically, in the persisting 
delusion of our radical separateness from others. This individualistic view of self underpins the 
sense of entitlement of many (not all) of the wealthy, who refuse to help. While the opposing 
view of interdependency is slowly gaining currency, it has yet to filter through to tangible 
outcomes with policy-makers, politicians, the big end of town, and the general public. 
Homelessness is not just a problem for the individual enduring it. It has direct consequences for 
the wider society, including for you and me. And simply, we must ask ourselves, what kind of 
society do we want to live in? 
So with this in mind, in the next part of this article I wish to venture into the philosophical 
questions concerning the nature of the self with regard to this issue of homelessness. I will do so 
by drawing on the work of key figures in the phenomenological tradition – notably Levinas, 
Merleau-Ponty, and Scheler. 
Self, Place, Belonging & Hospitality 
In his book Totality and Infinity (1961, trans 1969), in the chapter titled ‘Dwelling’, Emmanuel 
Levinas offers an extended meditation on the notions of ‘dwelling, habitation, home and 
hospitality’. For Levinas, hospitality operates in two domains – the ethical and the political. 
Within the ethical domain, the individual has a moral obligation to give shelter under their own 
roof. In the political domain, as citizens of a country, to be hospitable we must welcome all those 
who truly seek refuge into our homeland. 
Levinas sets out various conceptions of ‘home’. Home is an implement which offers protection 
from the elements and enemies; as an implement it may also be a source of pleasure, such as 
when using a good tool can provide immense satisfaction. Home may also be considered a 
possession which is convertible into money. Levinas also describes home as the place of 
recollection – a place of gathering the self, thus providing our launching place for our activity in 
the world. Finally, home is a place of interiority – of safety, intimacy, and welcome. It is home 
in these last two senses that I wish to explore: home as the shelter from external threats, and as a 
place to recollect the self – to revive and to gather resources needed to venture into the world and 
contribute to society. 
As Levinas writes: “To dwell, is not the simple fact of the anonymous reality of a being cast into 
existence, as a stone one casts behind oneself; it is recollection, a coming to oneself, a retreat 
home with oneself as in a land of refuge, which answers to a hospitality, an expectancy, a human 
welcome” (p.156). Here we can see Levinas expressing a view common to many philosophical 
and psychological traditions, of home as being a symbol for the self. And there is an inside and 
an outside to this self. He says: “Man abides in the world as having come to it from a private 
domain, from being at home with himself, to which at each moment he can retire… he goes forth 
outside from an inwardness. Yet this inwardness opens up in a home which is situated in the 
outside – for the home, as a building, belongs to a world of objects” (p.152). 
Like the embodied self, the home has both an interior and an exterior; and as there are doors and 
windows for the home, so too there are also the self’s expressive doors of face, gesture and 
language. Neither the home nor the self are impenetrable interiorities, entirely separate from 
others and the outside world. 
These challenges to the interiority and exteriority divide are also key to the thought of another 
French phenomenologist, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who argues for an intrinsic interdependence 
between self and other.in his book The Phenomenology of Perception (1962). For Merleau-
Ponty, subjectivity is an intersubjectivity, and otherness is a category both internal to and 
constitutive of the self. It is due to this self-alienation internal to the subject that other selves, 
alter egos, and all interactions with other people, become possible. 
This way of thinking about our intersubjectivity can provide a useful means of inquiring into 
homelessness. It is clear that something philosophically interesting is going on in our profound 
distress with regard to the plight of the homeless. I propose it is because the sight of homeless 
people challenges our sense of entitlement and also our sense of self and belonging. It makes us 
recognise how fragile these things in fact are; that we too could potentially become victim to any 
number of the misfortunes, such as have been visited on those living under bridges and on 
streets. 
There is also the fear of those living an unrooted life, without community and therefore without 
the demands and constraints of social belonging. The homeless person becomes truly alien. As 
philosopher Anthony Steinbock has proposed in his article ‘Homelessness and the Homeless 
Movement’ (Human Studies, 17 (2), 1994), drawing on the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl, 
our own ‘homeworlds’ are co-constituted by the ‘alienworld’ of the homeless. The homeless do 
not belong to our community; they do not share our culture, our values, our social etiquette, our 
ways of eating and urinating. This is why our efforts are usually inadequate to addressing the 
problems of homelessness: one of the dangers for any intervention is that the homeless person 
becomes a project of the helper intervening; and then what inevitably comes into play is an 
almost coercive normalizing of the homeless person. The challenge is to offer support in a way 
that does not violate their autonomy, nor render them predictable, controllable, and acceptable 
according to our own standards. 
The Double Incorporation 
Here I want to engage with the key phenomenological idea that, just as Merleau-Ponty asserted, 
subjectivity is an intersubjectivity; or as the German phenomenologist Max Scheler describes the 
double incorporation of the ‘I’ within the ‘we’ and the ‘we’ within the ‘I’ in The Nature of 
Sympathy (1913, trans 2009): “community is in some sense implicit in every individual, and that 
man is not only part of society, but that society and the social bond are an essential part of 
himself: that not only is the ‘I’ a member of the ‘we’, but also that the ‘we’ is a necessary 
member of the ‘I’” (pps.229, 230). 
This view rejects the idea of the isolated, atomistic subject, and instead says that in the core of 
our subjectivity is both the ‘I’ perspective and the ‘we’ perspective. When identification centers 
solely on the ‘I’, the person is dominated by individualism and competition. However, when the 
sense of self embraces the ‘we’, the values become collective ones and the orientation is 
characterized by cooperation. The more the circle of ‘we’ is widened, the more the subject is 
available to others. The subject with the ‘we’ orientation identifies as being one among others, as 
belonging – whether at the level of family, community, species, or at its most expanded, as one 
sentient being among others. Empathic responsiveness is not guaranteed, however, because if the 
‘we’ is defined narrowly and constrained only to certain others – to family, race, the religious 
community, etc – the excluded do not arouse any sense of fellow-feeling, and in fact they may 
rather incite fear, aversion, hatred and aggression. We see this also with the stigmatization of the 
homeless. Despite their tragic circumstances, they are not recognized as deserving of a place, of 
belonging: they are excluded. And it is this alienation even more than the physical discomforts of 
sleeping rough and the challenges of survival that leads to the psychological deterioration of the 
homeless. They are living within a society to which they do not belong, and from which there is 
no welcome. This, I propose, because of the double incorporation, is a violence towards them at 
the most basic level of their sense of self. And this is why so many homeless people display 
symptoms of compounded trauma, combining the impacts of whatever led them to the streets in 
the first place with their rejection and exclusion from the wider society. 
So the question is, how can we get especially the politicians and the big end of town to expand 
their sense of ‘we’? Albert Einstein captures exactly the core of the issue when he writes: 
“A human being is part of a whole, called by us ‘universe’ – a part limited in time and space. He 
experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings, as something separated from the rest… a kind of 
optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to 
our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free 
ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures 
and the whole of nature in its beauty.” 
(Letter from Einstein to a father on the death of his son, 12/02/1950.) 
Homeless people are citizens with rights to vote; but their other basic human rights are not being 
respected: the right to a home, a shelter from the elements and from external threat, a base from 
which to carve out a place in the working world and the social world. Homelessness is my 
problem and your problem. Solutions to homelessness lie not just in social action, policy, or 
economics, but most fundamentally in our conceptions of ourselves and our society. When we 
can break out of the prison of the delusion of our separateness, and meet these others in 
solidarity, then the political will to address homelessness, and many other social injustices, will 
be found. 
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